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Modele niepełnosprawności i ich wpływ na decyzje sądowe. 
Wstępne podejście z perspektywy hiszpańskiego orzecznictwa
SUMMARY
The purpose of this article is to show the influence on judicial decisions of the approach to disa-
bility embedded in the person’s mentality. A brief introduction to the different paradigms of disability 
is previously provided, distinguishing mainly between the medical and the social model, and noting 
that the latter has been incorporated by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
The analysis of two recent decisions of the Spanish Supreme Court illustrates the influence of the 
different models of disability on legal judgements. Finally, some conclusions from this analysis are 
suggested, which can mark a path for future research.
Keywords: disability; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; judicial inter-
pretation of the law
INTRODUCTION: MEDICAL VS SOCIAL MODEL OF DISABILITY
According to A. Palacios, among other authors, three different models of treat-
ment of disability by society and Law can be identified throughout history1. The 
most ancient one, that she calls “disregarding model”, is based on the assumption 
1 A. Palacios, The social model in the International Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, “The Age of Human Rights Journal” 2015, Vol. 4, pp. 91–110. A deeper analysis 
in: eadem, El modelo social de discapacidad: orígenes, caracterización y plasmación en la Con-
vención Internacional sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad, Madrid 2008. See also 
A. Martínez-Pujalte, Derechos fundamentales y discapacidad, Madrid 2015.
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that persons with disabilities do not provide anything useful to society and their 
life is not worth living, and therefore they are “disregarded”, and either physically 
eliminated or excluded from society and placed in a space of marginalization. In 
the second model, the person with a disability is seen as a sick person, who has 
to be cared for and is the object of a public policy aimed to his or her healing and 
rehabilitation; and is deemed as capable of lending a useful contribution to society 
only as long as he or she is rehabilitated. There is, however, a substantial continuity 
between this rehabilitation model – also called by other authors “medical model” – 
and the previous one, because the person will be excluded from society if his or her 
recovery is not achieved, and, above all, when it appears as impossible. The basic 
feature of this medical model is, moreover, that it locates disability within the indi-
vidual: it is “exclusively a problem of the person, produced by disease, accident or 
a health condition that requires medical care provided by professionals in the form 
of individual treatments”2. And, if the person is excluded from society, exclusion 
is regarded as an individual problem and the reasons for exclusion are seen in the 
impairment. The third model means, on the contrary, a radical change of perspec-
tive, because it stresses equal dignity of all human beings independently from their 
capacities, requiring thus full integration and participation of everyone in society, 
also of persons with disabilities. The focal point moves now from the conditions of 
the person that entail an impairment towards the conditions of society that impede 
his or her full participation of society because he or she faces the barriers of a social 
environment that has not been designed considering his or her needs. Therefore, this 
model has been called “social model”; or, as S. French and J. Swain have observed, 
the “barriers approach”:
[…] disability is viewed not in terms of the individual’s impairment, but in terms of environmen-
tal, structural and attitudinal barriers that impinge upon the lives of disabled people and which have 
the potential to impede their inclusion and progress in many areas of life, including employment, 
education and leisure, unless they are minimized or removed3.
On 13 December 2006, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (hereinafter: the Convention), 
which, according to its Article 45, entered into force on 3 May 2008 (“on the thirtieth 
day after the deposit of the twentieth instrument of ratification or accession”), and 
which up to this moment has been ratified by 181 countries. As many authors have 
already pointed out, the Convention means a deep change of paradigm in the approach 
2 A. Palacios, The social model…, p. 93.
3 S. French, J. Swain, Changing relationships for promoting health, [in:] Tidy’s Physiotherapy, 
ed. S. Porter, Edinburgh 2013, pp. 183–205.
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of society and Law to the phenomenon of disability4. While, until recently, the med-
ical model of disability has been the dominant paradigm – and it is still reflected in 
many national laws5 – the Convention adopts the social model of disability from its 
Preamble, which asserts that “disability results from the interaction between persons 
with impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinders their full 
and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others”. In connection 
with this explanation of disability, Article 1 of the Convention defines persons with 
disabilities as “those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory 
impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and 
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others”. As can be seen, 
the center of the concept of disability provided by the Convention is the existence 
of barriers to social participation; of course, those barriers have to be related to an 
impairment of the person – because, otherwise, we would not talk about disability, 
but about some other form of discrimination – but what causes disability is not the 
impairment itself: in fact, there can be an impairment which is not associated to 
barriers, like for example myopia, and in such a case there is no disability. What 
determines the appearance of disability is that there are barriers placed by society, 
which hinder social participation.
An important consequence of social model of disability is the emphasis placed 
on non-discrimination on the basis of disability, which is a basic principle of the 
Convention, to which Article 5 is devoted; moreover, most articles reflect also this 
principle, because they recognize the different human rights to persons with disabili-
ties “on an equal basis with others”, a clause which is very often repeated throughout 
the Convention. As equal participation and enjoyment of their rights by persons with 
disabilities is hindered by environmental barriers, the main duty of public powers is 
to remove those barriers. As A. Palacios writes,
[…] the obstacles faced by persons with disabilities when exercising their rights are the result 
of a society exclusively thought for an average standard person (the model of which is normally 
provided by a non-disabled man). In order to remove these barriers, the Convention puts forward 
various strategies, which require a wide and inclusive look at human diversity6.
4 See the contributions by Palacios quoted in footnote 1. See also T. Degener, A human rights 
model of disability, [in:] Handbook of Disability Law and Human Rights, eds. P. Blanck, E. Flynn, 
London 2016, pp. 31–49.
5 See, e.g., the definition of disability contained in section 6 of the English Equality Act, 2010: 
“A person (P) has a disability if (a) P has a physical or mental impairment, and (b) the impairment has 
a substantial and long-term adverse effect on P’s ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities”. 
As can be seen, this definition focuses only on the impairment of the person and its adverse effects, 
making no reference to the barriers posed by society. Therefore, it is a definition not consistent with 
the Convention, which adopts a quite different approach, as is explained in the text.
6 A. Palacios, The social model…, p. 102.
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The Convention aims at universal accessibility, which is also a basic principle, 
to which Article 9 is devoted. If universal accessibility is not possible, the Conven-
tion provides for reasonable accommodations. And, in connection with the different 
rights recognized, various measures are established to facilitate access to rights, e.g. 
support in exercising legal capacity (Article 12), procedural accommodations for 
access to justice (Article 13), community support services to prevent segregation 
from the community (Article 19), individualized support measures in the field of 
education (Article 24), assistance in employment (Article 27), assistance in voting 
(Article 29), etc.
The purpose of the present study is to show the influence on judicial decisions of 
the approach to disability embedded in the person’s mentality. As has been shown, 
the Convention is inspired by the social model of disability. But that does not mean 
that this paradigm has been already incorporated into the mentality of the people, 
not even those who serve as judges. And their approach to disability influences 
their decisions. I will show this by selecting two recent important judgements of 
the Spanish Supreme Court related to disability.
THE MEDICAL MODEL: JUDGEMENT OF THE SPANISH SUPREME 
COURT OF 17 MARCH 2016
Until its recent reform by Organic Law 2/2018 of 5 December, which recog-
nized right to vote to all persons with disabilities, Spanish Electoral Law contained 
a provision (Article 3.1.b) authorizing judges to deprive persons with disabilities 
who had been declared legally incapable of their right to vote. This is the question 
examined by the Spanish Supreme Court in the judgement of 17 March 2016. 
A young woman called Rosalia had been declared legally incapable, and guard-
ianship had been entrusted to her parents. In application of Article 3.1.b of the 
Spanish Electoral Law, she was also deprived from the right to vote. The parents 
appealed the judgement before the Supreme Court only in relation to this aspect. 
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the initial judgement.
That the reasoning of the Spanish Supreme Court is based on the medical model 
of disability is clearly shown by two main facts. On the one hand, the main argument 
used by the Supreme Court is the best interest of the person. It explicitly states that 
the measure adopted must be the most beneficial for the interest of the person, and 
afterwards it confirms – without providing a justification of this conclusion – that 
in this case the most beneficial measure is the deprivation of her right to vote, al-
though the Court recognizes that she wished to participate in elections. As can be 
seen, the “best interests” paradigm, as it has been called by the UN Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, entails substituting the will and preferences 
on the person by what is believed to be in her objective “best interests”, and it is 
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based on the assumption that the person cannot make a right decision because of 
her impairments, being thus a remnant of the medical model7. On the other hand, 
the Court insists indeed on the impairments of the person, arguing that they impede 
her to exercise her right to vote. In this sense, the judgement explains that her cog-
nitive competences are equal to a child between 6 and 8 years of age, that she has 
an almost total ignorance of the value of money and of basic legal concepts, that 
she shows a lack of basic political knowledge (ignorance on political parties or on 
the content of elections), and that she lacks capacity to make elementary decisions; 
all these reasons confirm, in opinion of the Court, that she lacks the basic skills 
which are necessary to exercise the right to vote.
An appropriate assessment of this decision of the Spanish Supreme Court re-
quires taking into account that, in Spanish Law, international treaties which have 
been validly concluded and officially published are directly applicable, and their 
development or implementation by internal legal regulations is not required. In 
this sense, Article 96.1 of the Spanish Constitution states that “validly concluded 
international treaties, once officially published in Spain, shall be part of the internal 
legal system”, and the Act 25/2014 of 27 November on International Treaties, con-
firms explicitly that they are directly applicable, “unless it is clear from their text 
that such application is conditional on the approval of relevant laws or regulatory 
provisions” (Article 30), and that they prevail over any other internal rule in case 
of conflict (Article 31).
Article 29 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities re-
quires State Parties “to ensure that persons with disabilities can effectively and 
fully participate in political and public life on an equal basis with others, directly 
or through freely chosen representatives, including the right and opportunity for 
persons with disabilities to vote”. This rule contains a direct and explicit recognition 
of right to vote to persons with disabilities, with no limitation, and was, therefore, 
clearly contradictory with Article 3.1.b of the Spanish Electoral Law. Therefore, 
the Supreme Court, according to Article 31 of the Act on International Treaties, 
should have decided the prevalence of Article 29 of the Convention and rejected 
the application of Article 3.1.b of the Electoral Law. Why wasn’t this the decision 
of the Spanish Supreme Court? Because its decision is based on a preconception of 
disability, which is implicitly shown by its reasoning. And I call it a preconception 
because it is not grounded on legal norms or on the facts of the case. According to 
such preconception: 1) persons with disabilities are not entirely free; therefore, the 
Court invokes as an argument of its decision “the protection of the general interest 
7 On the “best interests” paradigm, see Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
General Comment No. 1, Article 12: Equal recognition before the Law, 19 May 2014, specially No. 
21 and 27 (retrieved from: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/031/20/PDF/
G1403120.pdf?OpenElement, access: 24.05.2020).
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in a free participation in elections”; 2) persons with disabilities should be protected 
against their own preferences, and should be helped and cared for even if they do 
not want such help or care (in a few words, we can talk about a paternalist precon-
ception of disability, which is also characteristic of the medical model); therefore, 
although in this case the person wishes to participate in elections, the Court decides 
that denial of that participation is better protection of her interests; 3) the exclusion 
of society – in this case, of political participation – of the person with a disability is 
only a natural consequence of her impairments. This preconception leads the Court 
to take the decision of depriving the person of her right to vote8.
In my opinion, the judgement of Spanish Supreme Court of 17 March 2016 
clearly shows the influence of the preconception of disability – in this case, a pre-
conception closely linked to a medical model of disability – on judicial decisions. 
In the next section, I will contrast it with another more recent decision of the Court.
THE SOCIAL MODEL: JUDGEMENT OF THE SPANISH SUPREME 
COURT OF 21 JUNE 2019
The judgement of the Spanish Supreme Court of 21 June 2019 deals with the 
right of persons with disabilities to inclusive education. In the case, the parents of 
a child of 4 years of age with a developmental disability chose for him a public 
ordinary school, which I will call School A, but the educational authorities decided 
his schooling in another public school, School B (which was also an ordinary school, 
not a special school for children with disabilities). The parents based their choice 
of School A on two reasons. On the one hand, School A concentrated all the classes 
in the morning, from 9.00 am to 2.00 pm, while School B had a split working day, 
the schedule being from 9.30 to 12.30 and from 15.00 to 17.00; and, in the opinion 
of the parents, the first schedule is more appropriate for their child, because in the 
afternoon he has to attend individual therapy sessions, and because it concentrates 
classes in the time of the day where he is more awake and receptive. On the other 
8 It should be pointed out that this judgement of the Supreme Court was confirmed by the 
Spanish Constitutional Court, which denied the constitutional complaint filed by the parents of Ro-
salia (decision of 28 November 2016). Apart from a weak and inconsistent argumentation attempting 
to show the compatibility between Article 3.1.b of the Spanish Electoral Law and Article 29 of the 
Convention, the decision of the Constitutional Court does not add new arguments to those used by the 
Supreme Court, but insists mainly on the lack of freedom of Rosalia – therefore, she is not capable 
to exercise freely her right to vote – and the fact that she can be easily influenced by other persons. 
A further examination of these judgements and the problems related can be seen in: P. Cuenca Gomez, 
El derecho al voto de las personas con discapacidad intelectual y psicosocial. La adaptación de la 
legislación electoral española a la Convención Internacional de los Derechos de las Personas con 
Discapacidad, “Derechos y Libertades” 2018, No. 38, pp. 171–202.
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hand, the mother is a teacher at School A. However, the authorities decided that 
he should attend School B, because School B has an educational assistant, which 
lacks in School A, who would be in charge of the personal attention to the child. 
The parents challenged this decision before the Regional Court. After the dismissal 
of their petition, they appealed to the Supreme Court.
Although the Supreme Court’s argumentation is not quite systematic, two main 
reasons can be discovered in support of its decision. Firstly, the Supreme Court 
recognizes that the right to inclusive education is not formally at issue, because 
both schools, the school preferred by the parents and the school decided by the 
Public Administration, are inclusive schools, where children with and without 
disabilities interact. But the right to inclusive education is not satisfied merely by 
the fact that children with disabilities and children without disabilities share the 
same school; on the contrary, it requires to provide education in the environment 
where the children can reach their maximum personal development, taking into 
account the particular needs and circumstances of each child, in order to guarantee 
that each child effectively benefits from education and achieves progresses on an 
equal basis with others. Secondly, although, according to the Spanish Education 
Act (Article 84), the right of the parents to choose a specific school for their chil-
dren is subordinated to the availability of school posts, in this case to attend the 
preference of the parents can be seen as a reasonable accommodation, that has to 
be provided to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise of their 
rights on an equal basis with others (Article 2 of the Convention), unless it imposes 
a disproportionate or undue burden. The arguments provided by plaintiffs, in this 
case, show that the most appropriate environment for the child is School A, the 
one preferred by the parents; while it has not been proved that placing the child 
in School A imposes a disproportionate or undue burden. Therefore, the Supreme 
Court upholds the appeal and annuls the decision of placing the child in School B.
Can we say that this judgement is based on a different preconception of dis-
ability than the one presented in the previous section of this article? I think that 
there are strong reasons to give indeed an affirmative answer to this question. In 
particular, there are three aspects of the reasoning of the Court that deserve to be 
outlined and that mark a heavy contrast with the judgement examined in the previ-
ous section. Firstly, as has been shown the whole reasoning of the Court is founded 
on a discourse of human rights. In fact, the decision of the Court is solely based 
on the rights of persons with disabilities (in this case, of the plaintiffs’ son): right 
to inclusive education and right to equality (which includes the right to reasonable 
accommodations). No other argument is taken into account. Secondly, it is inter-
esting to notice that the Court takes for granted, and therefore does not consider 
necessary to offer an explicit justification, that the right to education entails the 
right to “inclusive” education, provided thus in ordinary schools shared by children 
with disabilities and children without disabilities, implicitly rejecting in this way 
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any kind of segregation or exclusion of persons with disabilities. But probably 
the most remarkable feature of the reasoning of the Court, in this case, is that, in 
contrast with the previous judgement, it makes no link between the impairment of 
the child and any disadvantage that he has to suffer or tolerate. It would have been 
easy to argue, for example, that, because he has an impairment, he needs the help 
of an assistant, and therefore his freedom of choice cannot be respected (in this 
case, freedom of choice is exercised by his parents on his behalf, as he is a minor 
of only 4 years of age). But such an argument does not appear in the judgement. 
In fact, the only reference to the impairment that can be read in the judgement is 
made by the parents, to justify that the most appropriate schedule for their child is 
the one offered by School A.
The analysis that has just been carried out proves consistently, in my opinion, 
that the judgement of Spanish Supreme Court of 21 June 2019 reflects an approach 
to disability essentially different from that shown in the judgement of 17 March 
2016. In other words, while the latter is based on the medical model of disability, 
the decision of 2019 clearly assumes the social model. It could be objected, how-
ever, that what the Supreme Court does in this judgement is merely to apply the 
provisions of the Convention – in particular Article 24.2.d, that requires States 
Parties to provide education to persons with disabilities “in environments that 
maximize academic and social development”, and Article 5.3, which orders the 
implementation of reasonable accommodations to protect equality – and, therefore, 
there is no need to seek an explanation of its decision in a supposed preconception 
of disability. However, this objection can be easily refuted. It is true, of course, that 
the Convention plays a key role in the judgement as the main normative justifica-
tion of the decision. This is completely reasonable, because, as has already been 
explained, the Convention is in Spain a binding and directly applicable legal source, 
and is also, according to Article 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution9, an interpretative 
parameter of the internal norms on fundamental rights recognized by the Constitu-
tion, as in this case right to education, recognized by Article 27. But it is also true 
that the Convention does not offer an explicit answer to the problem examined in 
the judgement. Therefore, the decision that has been adopted and, above all, the 
reasoning of the Court, show that, beyond the strict application of the provisions 
of the Convention, what the Tribunal has assumed is the paradigm of disability that 
underlies it. We find a reasoning and a decision drawn up from the premises of the 
social model, which the Court has made its own and that, therefore, becomes the 
preconception from which the Court reads legal norms.
9 Article 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution: “Provisions relating to the fundamental rights and 
liberties recognized by the Constitution shall be interpreted in conformity with the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights and international treaties and agreements thereon ratified by Spain”.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
As is shown by the title of this article, the precedent study of two selected 
judgements of the Spanish Supreme Court related to disability can only be seen as 
a preliminary approach to the question proposed: the influence of preconceptions of 
disability on judicial decisions. A wider research should be conducted, examining 
more judgements and comparing decisions from different national courts. Never-
theless, this first analysis authorizes to draw some provisory conclusions, which 
can show a path for future research.
On the one hand, although the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities entered into force more than 10 years ago, it seems that the social model 
of disability that informs it has not yet permeated the common mentality, not even 
that of legal operators, what highlights the importance of awareness-raising about 
a correct understanding of disability and about the correct approach towards persons 
with disabilities. I use the word “correct”, because, although it might seem obvious, 
it is perhaps convenient to point out explicitly that the different perspectives on 
disability mentioned in the first section of this article are not neutral theoretical 
approaches among which one can choose; on the contrary, the disregarding model 
and the medical model have serious ethical difficulties, while the social model is 
the only one fully consistent with respect of human dignity. Indeed, the principle 
of human dignity underlines that the person deserves a respect which is not linked 
to his or her particular conditions or features; it is, properly said, an unconditional 
respect. The main specification of this respect is the duty to respect and protect the 
basic person’s goods, what we call human rights. But this requirement of uncon-
ditional respect to the person has also other consequences. Firstly, as all persons 
deserve an equal respect, all have an equal entitlement to take an active role in the 
community. Secondly, the proclamation of human dignity as the basis of legal and 
political order, contained in most modern constitutions10, entails that the point of 
view from which political community and Law have to see every person is even 
his or her condition of person, which is his or her most prominent feature, while 
other characteristics or attributes are merely secondary. Finally, respect of human 
dignity implies for the political community the duty to take all measures required 
to facilitate full participation in society and enjoyment of his or her rights by every 
person when he or she faces obstacles that impede it. In relation to disability, these 
principles require to ensure full participation of persons with disabilities in society, 
protection of their human rights and of their equality with any other persons, and 
the implementation of the measures which might be needed to protect these de-
mands removing social barriers that hinder their satisfaction. These are in fact the 
10 See, e.g., Article 1 of the German Constitution, Article 10.1 of the Spanish Constitution or 
Article 30 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
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main premises of social model, that are, as can be seen, a translation of the basic 
requirements of human dignity.
Nevertheless, although the social model is based on recognition of human 
dignity, it has to be acknowledged that it constitutes a completely new paradigm, 
which in some aspects can be described without exaggeration as revolutionary, and 
which requires a change of mentality and even a revision of traditional legal insti-
tutions and concepts that have lasted for centuries11. This circumstance highlights 
the importance of awareness-raising and of appropriate training of legal operators. 
In fact, the Convention devotes an article to this issue, Article 8, which requires 
the adoption of measures by State Parties to foster respect for the rights and dig-
nity of persons with disabilities, to combat stereotypes, and to promote awareness 
of the capabilities and contributions of persons with disabilities; and Article 13.2 
adds that “States Parties shall promote appropriate training for those working in 
the field of administration of justice”. A recent report of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has insisted on the significance of 
awareness-raising to achieve the objectives of the Convention, emphasizing that 
“awareness-raising plays a key role in promoting respect for human rights as it 
targets the underlying attitudes, values and beliefs that are at the root of human 
rights violations, including discriminatory laws, policies, discourse and conduct”12. 
It is interesting to point out that, according to this report, “the charity and medical 
models are the most prevalent in law, policy and practice”13, what has been con-
firmed by the analysis of the Spanish Supreme Court’s judgement of 17 March 2016 
provided in section 2 of the present article. Moreover, the report mentions as one of 
the most common stereotypes against persons with disabilities the assumption that 
“persons with disabilities need protection”, what “leads to infantilization, substi-
11 For example, the concepts and institutions related with legal capacity and guardianship, see 
on this question: A. Martínez-Pujalte, Legal Capacity and Supported Decision-Making: Lessons from 
Some Recent Legal Reforms, “Laws” 2019, Vol. 8(1), DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/laws8010004, 
p. 4; A. Arstein-Kerslake, Restoring Voice to People with Cognitive Disabilities: Realizing the Right 
to Equal Recognition before the Law, Cambridge 2017.
12 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Awareness-raising under 
Article 8 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (A/HRC/43/27), 17 December 
2019, No. 5, www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Disability/Article8/A_HRC_43_27_AdvanceEdit-
edVersion.docx [access: 20.01.2020].
13 Ibidem, No. 12. Following Palacios (The social model…), the present article does not dis-
tinguish between the charity model and the medical model but considers them as one. In fact, the 
report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights defines the charity model in the following 
terms: “The charity model considers persons with disabilities as passive objects of kind (charitable) 
acts or welfare recipients only, rather than as empowered individuals with equal rights. Under this 
model, disability is an individual’s problem and persons with disabilities are not considered capable 
of providing for themselves on account of their impairments; rather, they are considered as a burden 
on society, which bestows its benevolence on them”. All those are in our conception features of the 
medical model, as explained in section 1.
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tution of the person in decision-making and denial of autonomy” and has as legal 
consequence that persons with disabilities are denied “legal agency to make their 
own decisions”. As was examined in section 2, this stereotype is indeed the main 
justification of the decision of the Supreme Court on the right to vote, associated 
to the stereotype, also commented by the report, that “persons with disabilities are 
incapable”14. To combat these stereotypes and to instil a new look towards disability 
seems, therefore, crucial to achieve effective implementation of the Convention.
On the other hand, the second conclusion that can be drawn from the preliminary 
study presented in this article is rather of a legal-philosophical nature, and to exam-
ine it deeply exceeds the purpose of these pages. But it should be at least pointed out 
that the analysis of the influence of preconceptions of disability on judicial decisions 
that has been carried out shows in fact only a specific example of a more general 
phenomenon: the influence of values on judicial decisions. This issue has received 
particular attention from North American scholars15, while a study of the influence 
of values on judicial decisions in European statutory legal systems remains to be 
done16. Of course, what seems evident is that old principles of legal positivism have 
to be discarded, because they do not provide a satisfactory explanation of real legal 
experience. In this context, two theses of legal positivism deserve especially to be 
mentioned: its theory of legal interpretation, according to which legal interpretation 
is a merely mechanical and rational enterprise, strictly submitted to certain logical 
rules, and what N. Bobbio calls methodological positivism, according to which 
Law is an objective and neutral science, which has to be thus completely separated 
from ideological and moral values, that are always subjective17. On the contrary, 
real legal experience shows the difficulty of selecting and determining the legal 
norm that is applicable to each case, in a complex legal system with a plurality 
of legal sources among which there is not always a precise hierarchy, as well as 
the difficulty of subsuming varied human behaviors in the concepts used by legal 
norms, which are very often abstract and uncertain. These factors, among others, 
compel to admit that legal interpretation entails a wide margin of discretion and 
requires from the interpret different valuations, that are in many cases subjective 
14 Ibidem, No. 19 and 20.
15 According to D.J. Danielski (Values as variables in Judicial Decision-Making: Notes toward 
a Theory, “Vanderbilt Law Review” 1965, Vol. 19, pp. 721–740), the tradition of a scientific study of 
values in judicial decisions begins with the studies of H. Pritchett in the 1940s, especially his book The 
Roosevelt Court (New York 1948). Among the most recent contributions, see R. Cahill-O’Callaghan, 
The influence of personal values on legal judgments, “Journal of Law and Society” 2013, Vol. 40(4), 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6478.2013.00642.x, pp. 596–623.
16 In Poland, W. Dziedziak (Axiological Basis for the Application of Law – A Perspective of 
the Equitable Law, ,,Studia Iuridica Lublinensia” 2015, Vol. 24(2), DOI: https://doi.org/10.17951/
sil.2015.24.2.49, pp. 41–71) has provided some theoretical basis for that study, but what lacks is 
a comprehensive empirical research of the real influence on values on legal judgements.
17 See N. Bobbio, Il positivismo giuridico, Torino 1979.
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and are, therefore, unavoidably led by his or her personal ethical and ideological 
conceptions18. To clarify to which extent judicial decisions are determined by legal 
norms, and to which extent they are influenced by the judge’s personal ethical and 
ideological conceptions, is of course a very difficult challenge. This article has tried 
to show, however, that it is a task that can be successfully undertaken.
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STRESZCZENIE
Celem artykułu było określenie wpływu, jaki na decyzje sądowe ma podejście do niepełnospraw-
ności wpisane w mentalność danej jednostki. Po przedstawieniu krótkiego wprowadzenia do różnych 
paradygmatów niepełnosprawności rozróżniono jej model medyczny i społeczny, zauważając, że ten 
ostatni został włączony do Konwencji o Prawach Osób Niepełnosprawnych. Analiza dwóch ostatnich 
orzeczeń hiszpańskiego Sądu Najwyższego ilustruje wpływ różnych modeli niepełnosprawności 
na orzeczenia sądowe. W podsumowaniu sformułowano wnioski, które mogą wyznaczyć kierunek 
przyszłych badań.
Słowa kluczowe: niepełnosprawność; Konwencja o Prawach Osób Niepełnosprawnych; sądowa 
interpretacja prawa
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